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Note

JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO SHOULD INTERPRET
MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA
GRACE O. HURLEY*
ABSTRACT
Regardless of the numerous differences between juveniles and adults, some states,
including the State of Ohio, continue to impose upon juvenile homicide offenders one
of the harshest forms of punishment: life without parole. In 2016, the United States
Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana, and in doing so, the Court
reiterated its previous contention that a sentence of juvenile life without parole should
only be imposed upon juvenile homicide offenders whose crimes reflect “irreparable
corruption.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to apply the Court’s Montgomery
decision, but this Note suggests that if it does, the court should utilize the case as a
way to end the imposition of this type of sentence on juveniles in Ohio.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States of America has routinely recognized that there are differences
between juveniles and adults.1 These differences are evidenced by juveniles’
proclivity for risks, inability to assess consequences, underdeveloped senses of
responsibility, lack of maturity, and vulnerability and susceptibility to negative
influences and outside pressures.2 In recognition of these differences, almost every
state in the U.S. prohibits juveniles from voting, enlisting to serve in the military,
buying cigarettes and alcohol, serving on juries, getting married without legal consent,
and driving before the age of sixteen.3 Nonetheless, some states, including the State
of Ohio, continue to impose upon juvenile homicide offenders one of the harshest
forms of punishment reserved for the nation’s most egregious adult criminals: life
without parole (“LWOP”).4
The U.S. is the only country in the world that sentences its children to LWOP for
crimes they committed before the age of eighteen.5 As of 2017, there were eight
1 See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/.
2 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472, 490 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010); see also Position Statement 58: Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders, MENTAL
HEALTH AMERICA, http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/life-without-parole-juveniles
(last visited Sept. 17, 2019) (“Developments in psychology and neuroscience support this
distinction and have continued to demonstrate fundamental differences between juveniles and
adults. Adolescents consistently score lower than adults in both ‘impulse’ control and
‘suppression of aggression.’ In evaluating decisions, adolescents are less likely than adults to
examine alternative options. Adolescents are also less ‘future-oriented’ than adults and have
less of an ‘ability to see short and long term consequences’ or to ‘take other people’s
perspectives into account.’ These findings, along with the ever-growing body of research
confirms that compared to adults, juveniles are less able to exercise self-control, less capable of
avoiding risky behaviors by considering alternative actions, and less attentive to the
consequences of impulsive actions.”).
3

Rovner, supra note 1, at 4.

4

For a list of adult criminals serving life sentences for their heinous crimes, see Famous Serial
Killers Who Are Still Alive, RANKER, https://www.ranker.com/list/famous-serial-killers-whoare-still-alive/ranker-crime (last visited Sept. 18, 2019) (discussing serial killers like David
Berkowitz, also known as “The Son of Sam,” who claimed that a demon dog told him to shoot
all of his victims. Berkowitz received six life sentences for killing six people and wounding
seven before being caught in 1977. Charles Cullen was sentenced to 127 years in prison after
being convicted of murdering at least 35 victims over the course of his sixteen-year nursing
career. It is suspected that Cullen is actually responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people).
5 Saki Knafo, Here Are All the Countries Where Children Are Sentenced to Die in Prison,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-lifewithout-parole_n_3962983.html (“The United States is the only country in the world that
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inmates serving LWOP sentences in Ohio for homicides that they committed, or were
involved in, when they were juveniles.6 The United States Supreme Court’s 2016
decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana is the latest in a series of Supreme Court cases
that have whittled away at the imposition of LWOP sentences on juvenile homicide
offenders.7 The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to apply the Court’s Montgomery
decision, but if it does, it should utilize the case as a way to end the imposition of this
type of sentence on juveniles in Ohio. If the court does so, Ohio will join twenty-one
other states and the District of Columbia in banning LWOP sentences for all
juveniles.8 Such a decision would also rid Ohio of the dangers associated with leaving
such a severe and debilitating sentence up to the discretion of trial court judges.
A number of U.S. Supreme Court cases serve as the background to this Note and
demonstrate the way in which the Court has nearly done way with the imposition of
juvenile LWOP. Beginning in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that
sentencing juveniles to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the United States Constitution.9 In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the Court ruled that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of LWOP sentences on juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses.10 In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court held
that sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory LWOP violates their
constitutional rights and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.11 Most recently, in
its 2016 decision in Montgomery, the Court held that Miller applies retroactively.12 In
doing so, the Court reiterated that this line of cases only rarely permits sentencings of
LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders whose crimes reflect “irreparable corruption”
and prohibits such sentencings for offenders whose crimes reflect “the transient
immaturity of youth.”13
This Note argues that Ohio should no longer allow its courts to sentence juveniles
to life imprisonment for four critical reasons. First, at the time of their offenses,
condemns people to spend their lives behind bars for crimes they committed before they turned
18.”); see also Juvenile Life Without Parole, JUVENILE LAW CENTER,
https://jlc.org/issues/juvenile-life-without-parole (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
6
See
50-State
Examination,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(July
31,
2017),
https://www.ap.org/explore/locked-up-for-life/50-states; see also End Juvenile Life Without
Parole, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/end-juvenile-life-without-parole (last visited Sept. 18,
2019) (“Approximately 2,570 children are sentenced to juvenile life without parole or ‘JLWOP’
in the United States. Despite a global consensus that children cannot be held to the same
standards of responsibility as adults and recognition that children are entitled to special
protection and treatment, the United States allows children to be treated and punished as
adults.”).
7

136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016).

8

See Mark Joseph Stern, Washington Supreme Court Prohibits Juvenile Life Without Parole,
SLATE (Oct. 18, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/washington-juvenile-lifewithout-parole.html.
9

543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).

10

560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).

11

567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).

12

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 724.

13

Id.
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juveniles are far more underdeveloped physically, mentally, and socially in
comparison to adults, making the imposition of this sentence on any juvenile cruel and
unjust. Second, the costs associated with juvenile LWOP sentencings are astronomical
and harmful to the state’s economy. Third, leaving the decision to impose such a
sentence to the discretion of trial court judges is dangerous, given that experienced
psychotherapists find making this determination nearly impossible. Finally, banning
juvenile LWOP would align Ohio with a growing number of states that have done
away with this type of sentence completely.
Part II of this Note provides a detailed background of the line of cases, both from
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio, that have
continuously limited juvenile LWOP sentences. Part III analyzes this trend in case law
and argues that Ohio should use the Court’s latest decision in Montgomery to do away
with the sentence in this state. Part IV offers a solution to this unconstitutional type of
sentencing and suggests that the Supreme Court of Ohio allow the possibility of parole
for all juvenile offenders, no matter their crime. Part V briefly concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile LWOP
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use of cruel
and unusual punishment.14 The death penalty and LWOP are the two types of
sentences that are regularly challenged under this amendment. The U.S. Supreme
Court has historically upheld these forms of punishment as consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.15 However, since the early 2000s, the Court has called into question the
constitutionality of imposing these types of sentencings on juveniles. As discussed
below, four notable U.S. Supreme Court cases have limited the imposition of juvenile
LWOP sentencings, without ever banning the sentence completely.
B. Roper v. Simmons: Banning the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles
In its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
sentencing individuals to death who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their
capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.16 At the age
of seventeen, respondent Christopher Simmons and his friend broke into Shirley
Crook’s home, drove her to a nearby state park, bound her hands and feet with
electrical wire, wrapped her face in duct tape, and then threw her from a bridge,
drowning her to death in the water below.17 After Simmons confessed to the murder,
the State of Missouri charged him with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and murder in
the first degree.18
14

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth
Amendment “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” 543
U.S. at 560.
15

Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–60.

16

543 U.S. at 551.

17

Id. at 556–57.

18

Id. at 557.
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At trial, Simmons was tried as an adult and found guilty of murder. The
prosecution sought the death penalty, and Simmons was sentenced to death. He
eventually appealed his sentence to the Missouri Supreme Court.19 There, the court set
aside Simmons’ death sentence and resentenced him to LWOP. 20 The State of
Missouri appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the
Missouri Supreme Court’s holding.21 The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment
applies to the death penalty, as the most severe form of punishment, with special
force.22 In banning the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, the Court
distinguished between children under the age of eighteen and adults, concluding that
there are three notable differences between these two groups that “render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.” 23 First, the Court noted
that juveniles do not have the same level of maturity and responsibility as adults. 24
Second, the Court found that juveniles are more susceptible to negative, outside
pressures than adults.25 Lastly, the Court reasoned that juveniles’ personalities are not
formed as well as adults’.26
The Court then went on to explain that the two main theories of punishment,
retribution and deterrence, do not apply to juveniles. 27 The Court reasoned that this is
because the way minors respond to punishment differs from adults. 28 As for
retribution, the Court remarked that “[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the
community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.” 29 As for
deterrence, the Court warned that the “same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to
deterrence.”30 In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court also addressed its concern
with the fact that the United States was the only country that still allowed juveniles to
be sentenced to death.31 For these reasons, the Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the imposition of the death penalty

19

Id. at 558–60.

20

Id. at 561.

21

Id.

22

Id. at 560 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988)).

23

Id. at 568–70.

24

Id. at 569.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 570.

27

Id. at 571–72.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 571.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 575.
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on offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed their
crimes.32
C. Graham v. Florida: Banning the Imposition of LWOP on Juveniles Convicted of
Non-Homicide Offenses
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of LWOP sentences on juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses.33 At the age of sixteen, petitioner Terrance Jamar
Graham and three other school-aged youths attempted to rob a restaurant located in
Jacksonville, Florida.34 Following his arrest, Graham was tried as an adult for
attempted robbery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced and served
concurrent three-year terms of probation, serving his first twelve months of probation
in the county jail.35 Less than six months after his release from jail, however, Graham
was arrested again for his participation in an armed home invasion robbery.36 The State
also alleged that Graham had participated in a second attempted robbery that same
evening, which resulted in one of his accomplices getting shot. 37 On the night of these
events, Graham was thirty-four days shy of his eighteenth birthday.38
At trial, a jury found Graham guilty of armed burglary and attempted armed
robbery and sentenced him to the maximum sentence authorized by the law: LWOP.39
The Florida Supreme Court denied review of Graham’s appeal, but the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari.40 Upon review, the Court analyzed controlling precedents
regarding the Eighth Amendment and ultimately determined that the punishment in
Graham violated the Constitution.41 In doing so, the Court first considered the
“objective indicia of society’s standards” in determining that there is a national
consensus against sentencing juveniles to LWOP for non-homicide offenses.42
Although the Court noted that a majority of states still allow this level of sentencing
for juveniles, it found that such a sentence is rarely imposed and has been “rejected
the world over.”43 In reaching its ultimate holding, the Court also considered the
32

Id. at 578–79.

33

560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).

34

Id. at 53.

35

Id. at 53–54.

36

Id. at 54.

37

Id. at 54–55.

38

Id. at 55.

39

Id. at 57.

40

Id. at 58.

41

Id. at 61, 67–75.

Id. at 61, 67 (“[A]n examination of actual sentencing practices in jurisdictions where the
sentence in question is permitted by statute discloses a consensus against its use . . . . The
sentencing practice now under consideration is exceedingly rare. And ‘it is fair to say that a
national consensus has developed against it.’”).
42

43 Id. at 62–63, 80 (“There is support for our conclusion in the fact that, in continuing to
impose life without parole on juveniles who did not commit homicide, the United States adheres
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differences between juveniles and adults detailed in Roper, the various theories of
punishment, and the fact that such a sentence prevents juveniles from receiving
rehabilitation.44
D. Miller v. Alabama: Banning Mandatory Juvenile LWOP
In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that
mandatory sentences of LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.45 Petitioner Evan Miller was
convicted and sentenced to mandatory LWOP for murder in the course of arson after
killing his neighbor, Cole Cannon, at the age of fourteen. 46 Throughout his youth,
Miller had been in and out of foster care due to his mother’s alcoholism and drug
addiction and his stepfather’s abuse.47 Miller also regularly used drugs and alcohol
and, by the age of fourteen, he had attempted suicide four times. 48
After his case was removed from juvenile court, Miller was charged as an adult
with murder in the course of arson, a charge that carried a mandatory sentence of
LWOP in Alabama.49 Thus, when a jury found Miller guilty of the offense, he was
mandatorily sentenced to LWOP.50 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
his sentence and the Alabama Supreme Court denied review of his appeal.51
Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed his
sentence.52
In reaching its holding, the Court once again reiterated the need to sentence adults
and juveniles differently because of the noted differences between the two groups. 53

to a sentencing practice rejected the world over. This observation does not control our decision.
The judgments of other nations and the international community are not dispositive as to the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. But ‘[t]he climate of international opinion concerning the
acceptability of a particular punishment’ is also ‘not irrelevant.’”).
See id. at 71–74; see also id. at 70 (stating “[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh
punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a
75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”).
44

45

567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).

46

Id. at 467–68.

47

Id. at 467.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 469.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53 Id. at 471 (“Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater
prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’
Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a
‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness,
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative
influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

7

2019]

JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE

109

The Court also addressed the importance of distinguishing between “the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” when imposing a
sentence of LWOP.54 To aide courts in making this distinction, the Court held that
“youth matters in determining the appropriateness” of a LWOP sentence. 55 Thus,
when sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide, a judge must be allowed to consider
the mitigating factors that accompany youth, such as the juvenile’s age, their agerelated characteristics, and the nature of their crime.56 Although the Court did not ban
juvenile LWOP in Miller, it cautioned that “appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” 57
E. Montgomery v. Louisiana: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Most Recent
Interpretation of Juvenile LWOP
The Court’s 2016 Montgomery v. Louisiana decision is the latest in the series of
U.S. Supreme Court cases that have limited the imposition of juvenile LWOP
sentences.58 In Montgomery, petitioner Henry Montgomery was seventeen years old
in 1963 when he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana.59 At his initial trial, Montgomery
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed his conviction and ordered a retrial.60 The jury then returned a verdict of
“guilty without capital punishment,” which carried an automatic sentence of LWOP.61
By the time Montgomery’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, he was sixty-nine
years old and had spent almost his entire life in prison.62
In Montgomery, the majority held that the Court’s Miller decision, prohibiting the
imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences on juveniles, was a substantive rule of
constitutional law and, as such, the rule applied retroactively.63 In its opinion, the
Court reiterated that a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics are to be
‘control over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific,
crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his
traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity.’”
(citations omitted)).
54 Id. at 479–80 (first citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); and then citing
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
55

Id. at 473.

56

Id. at 489.

57

Id. at 479.

58

136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016).

59

Id. at 725.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 725–26.

62

Id.

Id. at 734 (“Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. Like other substantive
rules, Miller is retroactive because it ‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’—
here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—‘faces a punishment that the law cannot impose
upon him.’”).
63
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considered prior to imposing a LWOP sentence. 64 Emphasizing that such sentences
should be uncommon, the Court again noted that its Miller decision only rarely
permitted sentencings of LWOP for juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect
“irreparable corruption” and prohibited such sentences for offenders whose crimes
reflect “the transient immaturity of youth.”65 Thus, the Court explained that its Miller
decision effectively barred the imposition of juvenile LWOP for any juvenile whose
crime does not reflect permanent and irreparable corruption.66 Ultimately, the Court
did not make a final decision regarding Montgomery’s release, but it made it clear that
if a juvenile offender’s crime resulted from their transient immaturity, then their
LWOP sentence may be a violation of their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment.67
F. Juvenile LWOP in Ohio
As of 2017, there were eight inmates serving LWOP sentences in the State of Ohio
for homicides they committed or were involved in when they were juveniles. 68 Several
more are serving de facto life sentences, terms so long that they amount to death
behind bars.69 In recent years, the Supreme Court of Ohio has interpreted all of the
above U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the imposition of juvenile LWOP, with
the exception of Montgomery. Two cases represent the court’s current understanding
of the sentence.
First, in State v. Long, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded a
juvenile homicide offender’s LWOP sentence after finding that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the defendant’s juvenile status as a mitigating factor prior to
sentencing him to LWOP.70 The court, interpreting Roper, Graham, and Miller,
64 Id. (“Miller, then, did more than require a sentence to consider a juvenile offender’s youth
before imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications for life
without parole collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’ Even if a court considers
a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the
Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’
Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but
‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,’ it rendered life without
parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status—that is,
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”).
65

Id.

66

Id.

67 Id. at 736–37. Although the Court did not make a final decision regarding Montgomery’s
release, it explained “prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their
crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and if it did not, their hope for some years of life
outside prison walls must be restored.”
68Andrew Welsh-Huggins, 8 Ohio Men Serving Life Without Parole for Homicide as Teens,
AP NEWS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/81172c6602cc4f92810b5b44e8c6c22f. WelshHuggins explains that T.J. Lane is one of the eight Ohio men serving LWOP sentences for
homicides they committed or were involved in when they were under the age of eighteen. Lane
was convicted of killing three students in a 2012 high school shooting that occurred in Chardon,
Ohio. He was seventeen at the time of his offense. Id.
69

Id.

70

8 N.E.3d 890, 899 (Ohio 2014).
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reasoned that “juveniles who commit criminal offenses are not as culpable for their
acts as adults are and are more amendable to reform.”71 Regardless of such a finding,
the court suggested that since “Miller did not go so far as to bar courts from imposing
the sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile,” its finding that
courts must consider youth and attendant circumstances as strong mitigating factors
was sufficient to ensure that the sentence “rarely be imposed on juveniles.” 72
Second, the court’s 2016 decision in State v. Moore represents its most recent
interpretation of juvenile LWOP.73 In Moore, the defendant appealed his conviction
pursuant to Graham after having been sentenced to an aggregate 112-year prison term
for non-homicide offenses that he committed at fifteen years old.74 In finding that the
appellate court abused its discretion in not granting the defendant’s application for
delayed reconsideration, the court stated that “the United States Supreme Court has
all but abolished life-without-parole sentences even for those juveniles who commit
homicide.”75 The court’s decision also included a state-by-state analysis detailing how
other high courts throughout the country have interpreted both Graham and Miller.76
In doing so, the court reasoned that their holding in Moore “is consistent with those of
other high courts that have held that for the purposes of applying the Eighth
Amendment protections set forth in Graham and Miller, there is no meaningful
distinction between sentences of life imprisonment without parole and prison
sentences that extend beyond a juvenile’s life expectancy.”77
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent interpretations of juvenile LWOP lead to two
notable inferences. First, the court understands and values the important distinctions
between juveniles and adults in imposing this harsh sentence, and second, the court
deems persuasive the ways in which other state high courts have interpreted the
sentence. In light of these findings, the court must utilize Montgomery as a means of
doing away with juvenile LWOP in the State of Ohio.
As of October 2018, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have abolished
LWOP for juveniles.78 This change reflects a rapid trend since the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery, considering that before those cases, only
four states had banned the sentence completely.79 A deeper analysis into the Court’s
major decisions dealing with juvenile LWOP suggests that states have banned the
sentence in light of the Court’s discussion of the noted differences between children
71

Id.

72

Id.

73

76 N.E.3d 1127 (Ohio 2016).

74

Id. at 1131.

75

Id. at 1140.

76

Id. at 1143–47.

77

Id.

78

See Stern, supra note 8.

79 See Does Your State Still Use Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Kids?, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR
SENTENCING OF YOUTH (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/does-your-stateuse-juvenile-life-without-parole-jlwop/.
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and adults in relation to their culpability, the costs and severity of a LWOP sentence
for the nation’s children, and the dangers associated with leaving such sentences up to
the discretion of judges.
A. Juveniles Are Underdeveloped Physically, Mentally, and Socially Compared to
Adults, Making the Imposition of LWOP on Any Juvenile Cruel and Unjust
In Miller, the Court described a sentence of LWOP as one that “foreswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”80 Similarly, in Graham, the Court described this
type of sentence as one that “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable” and that deprives youth of “the most basic liberties without giving a hope
of restoration.”81 The Graham Court went on to note that the punishment “means
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial;
it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
child], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.”82 In light of the Court’s somber
description of what a sentence of LWOP holds for juvenile offenders, the noted
differences between children and adults further a finding of the need to ban the
sentence completely.
In every U.S. Supreme Court case that has whittled away at the imposition of
juvenile LWOP, the Court has cited to the characteristics of children in rationalizing
each new limitation on imposing the sentence. For example, in banning mandatory
sentences of LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller, the Court reasoned that
a child’s “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences”
lessens their culpability for the crimes that they commit.83 With a lessened culpability,
the Court explained, a child’s “immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity” also
“make[s] them less likely to consider potential punishment.”84 With these
characteristics in mind, the Court further noted that another difference between adults
and children is that children have a “heightened capacity for change,” thus
strengthening the argument against sentencing juveniles to LWOP given that such a
sentence essentially makes rehabilitation an impossibility.85
Similarly, in Graham, the Court addressed this idea of culpability, explaining that
because children have a “lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most
severe punishments.”86 In rationalizing its new limitation on the imposition of the
sentence, the Court further noted the differences between children and adults,
explaining that “[a]s compared to adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility;’ they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;’ and their
characters are ‘not well formed.’”87 While the differences between juveniles and adults
80

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012).

81

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010).

82

Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).

83

Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 479.

86

Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.

87

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

11

2019]

JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE

113

are reason enough to ban juvenile LWOP, the negative economic costs associated with
such sentences is further justification for doing so.
B. Banning Juvenile LWOP Is Fiscally Responsible Because of the Astronomical
Economic Costs Associated with the Sentence
In the 2018 fiscal year, the State of Ohio spent nearly $2 billion on the state’s
correctional system.88 From that cost, $206 million was spent on the Department of
Youth Services (“DYS”).89 Since 2006, almost half of the $195.3 million reduction in
funding for Ohio’s correctional system came from the DYS as a direct result of policy
changes that increased community supervision for youth and closed institutional
facilities.90 This outcome stems from the state’s appreciation of the fact that less severe
sentences are beneficial not only for the youth, but for Ohio’s budget as well. 91 Thus,
banning the imposition of juvenile LWOP will not only alleviate the injustices
associated with such a sentence, but will also serve as a fiscally responsible policy in
shrinking the costs that Ohio spends on the state’s correctional system.
The economic effects associated with juvenile LWOP also impose heavy burdens
on families and communities in states throughout the U.S. 92 In 2016, the average cost
to house a prisoner in Ohio was $25,814.93 Nationally, the cost is nearly $35,000 a
year to house a prisoner and this number doubles when that prisoner passes the age of
fifty.94 Therefore, a fifty-year sentence for a sixteen-year-old sentenced to LWOP will
cost a state at least $2 to $2.5 million.95
The costs associated with juveniles serving life sentences are higher compared to
adults due to the harsh prison environments that they grow up in, accompanied by the
inadequate treatment that they receive while behind bars.96 Because life in prison

88 Wendy Patton, Ohio Budget Basics, POLICY MATTERS OHIO (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.policymattersohio.org/research-policy/quality-ohio/revenue-budget/budgetpolicy/ohio-budget-basics.
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Justice Policy Institute, Sticker Shock: Calculating the Full Price Tag for Youth
Incarceration 3 (2014) (“Policies that needlessly confine youth have an immediate cost for
taxpayers and our communities: across the states, taxpayers foot the bill for youth confinement
to the tune of hundreds of dollars per day and hundreds of thousands of dollars per year.”).
93

Kelsey Warner, State by State: How Much Does It Cost to Keep Someone in Prison?, TIMES
NEWS (May 3, 2016), https://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20160503/NEWS/160509836.
94

Rovner, supra note 1, at 4.

95

Emily Luhrs, Life Without Parole: Costly for Juveniles and Taxpayers, CENTER ON
JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (June 30, 2011), http://www.cjcj.org/news/5379 (“According
to a 2007 study conducted by UC Berkeley and Tulane University researchers, each new youth
sentenced to LWOP would cost the state at least $2 to $2.5 million.”).
96 Ashley Nellis, Still Life: America’s Increasing Use of Life and Long-Term Sentences,
SENTENCING PROJECT (May 3, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/still-lifeamericas-increasing-use-life-long-term-sentences/ (“The cost for life imprisonment is high, in
the range of $1 million per adult prisoner, with prison expenses rising precipitously after middleage. A partial cause of the eventual doubling of expenses as prisoners age is the heavy toll that
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exacerbates juveniles’ health status and accelerates their aging process, the costs
associated with their sentences are astronomical and have a detrimental effect on
taxpayers and states in general.97 Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio must also consider
these costs when tasked with banning juvenile LWOP. While the costs associated with
imposing this sentence are concerning, an even greater cause for concern stems from
leaving the determination of whether a juvenile is capable of rehabilitation up to the
discretion of trial court judges.
C. Leaving the Imposition of Juvenile LWOP Sentences Up to the Discretion of
Trial Court Judges Is Dangerous and Potentially Harmful
As the law stands today, before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to LWOP,
courts are expected to consider the youth’s chances of being rehabilitated and make a
finding as to whether or not their crime reflects “irreparable corruption” or “the
transient immaturity of youth.”98 Pursuant to this process, experts are typically called
upon to testify as to whether or not they believe a juvenile offender is capable of
rehabilitation, and, in turn, this testimony is meant to serve as an aid to the trial court
in making its sentencing determination.99 As the Court pointed out in Roper, however,
“[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crimes reflect unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 100
In 2012, in its amicus brief in support of the petitioners in Miller, the American
Psychological Association (“APA”) stressed:
[T]here is no reliable way to determine that a juvenile’s offenses are the result
of an irredeemably corrupt character; and there is thus no reliable way to
conclude that a juvenile—even one convicted of an extremely serious
offense—should be sentenced to life in prison, without any opportunity to
demonstrate change or reform.101
Admittedly, even experienced psychologists find predicting a youth’s ability to
rehabilitate impossible. Thus, it is inconceivable and harmful to this nation’s youth to
expect trial court judges to make this same determination before sentencing a juvenile
homicide offender to prison for the rest of their life.
prison itself has on human health. Typically, people entering incarceration already exhibit
poorer health compared to the general public, but the harsh prison environment, accompanied
by inadequate treatment, exacerbates prisoners’ heath status and accelerates the aging process.
People in prison experience higher rates of both chronic and infectious diseases as compared to
the general population.”).
97

Id.

98

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012).

99

See, e.g., State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 812–14 (Iowa 2016).

100
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). Another cause for concern, specific to the
state of Ohio, is the fact that state judges are elected to the bench. This means that sentencing
judges may lack experience as members of the judiciary, with a potential for some to have little
to no trial court experience whatsoever. See Bradley Link, Had Enough in Ohio? Time to Reform
Ohio’s Judicial Selection Process, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123, 149 (2004).

Brief of the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
101
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In another amicus brief filed in support of the petitioners in Miller, a group of
former juvenile court judges stressed the difficulties associated with predicting a
juvenile offender’s chances for rehabilitation.102 The judges urged that the best time
to evaluate whether a juvenile has the capacity for reform is “after they have had time
to mature, not when they are initially sentenced.”103 Taking these warnings into
consideration, it is apparent that there is no solution to this danger other than banning
the imposition of LWOP completely. An example of a trial court abusing its discretion
and violating a juvenile’s constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment
stems from the facts and findings in the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Sweet.104
In State v. Sweet, a court sentenced a sixteen-year-old to LWOP after he pleaded
guilty to two counts of first-degree murder.105 Prior to imposing this severe sentence
upon the juvenile, the court analyzed a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) that
was prepared in anticipation for the hearing.106 The report extensively outlined the
facts surrounding the juvenile’s crime, his failure to obtain his GED, his tumultuous
family dynamics, his unfortunate childhood circumstances, and his emotional and
personal health, where it was reported that Sweet had attempted suicide several times
in the past.107 State psychologists testified at the youth’s trial and explained that his
prospects for rehabilitation were “mixed.”108 Regardless of all of these findings and
noted cautions, the court sentenced the juvenile to LWOP.109
Because the judge in Sweet seemingly disregarded the mitigating circumstances
addressed in both the PSI and testimony of state psychologists, the case serves as a
perfect example of the dangers associated with leaving the imposition of juvenile
LWOP sentences up to the nation’s trial court judges. In finding Sweet’s sentence
constitutionally impermissible, the Iowa Supreme Court explained that it is wrong to
“ask our district court judges to predict future prospects for maturation and
rehabilitation when highly trained professionals say such predictions are
impossible.”110 With the above understanding of the dangers associated with trial
courts determining whether a LWOP sentence is appropriate for juveniles, it becomes
clear why a near majority of this nation’s states have banned this sentence entirely.
D. Banning Juvenile LWOP Would Align the State of Ohio With a Growing
Number of States That Have Done Away with the Sentence
In the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Moore decision, it deemed persuasive the ways in
which other state high courts throughout the U.S. were interpreting the imposition of
102 Brief of Former Juvenile Court Judges as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller,
567 U.S. 460 (No. 18-217).
103

Id.

104

Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 839.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 816.

107

Id. at 813–14.

108

Id. at 816.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 839.
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juvenile LWOP.111 The court recognized the importance of such an analysis even
before the U.S. Supreme Court’s Montgomery decision and before numerous states
throughout the U.S. banned the imposition of the sentence completely. Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have
all banned the imposition of juvenile LWOP in their respective states. 112
Understanding that this list is extensive, it is imperative to note that a growing number
of states throughout the country are taking the necessary and appropriate steps towards
banning this sentence, a trend that the Supreme Court of Ohio should follow. When it
does so, the court must first grasp the numerous ways that states have interpreted the
U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent juvenile LWOP decision, because each
interpretation has led the country towards the direction of ending the imposition of the
sentence for good.
1. State-by-State Interpretation of Montgomery v. Louisiana
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Miller and Montgomery decisions relating to
juvenile LWOP, numerous state legislatures throughout the U.S. have responded to
the Court’s rulings by changing their laws pertaining to the sentence. All of these
changes incorporate the mitigating qualities of youth that the Miller Court identified
in its decision. For example, in Nevada, the legislature revised the state’s juvenile
sentencing statute to require that courts “consider the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders, including, without limitation, the diminished culpability of juveniles
as compared to that of adults and the typical characteristics of youth.” 113 State
legislatures in Florida, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Missouri have all required that
trial courts only determine that LWOP is appropriate for a juvenile homicide offender
after they have considered factors like the effect of the defendant’s crime on the victim
and community, the offender’s maturity, intellectual capacity, impetuosity, possibility
111 State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1143 (Ohio 2016). In the section of its opinion titled
“Consistency with Other States,” the Supreme Court of Ohio engaged in a state-by-state
analysis, ultimately concluding that its holding “is consistent with those of other high courts
that have held that for purposes of applying the Eighth Amendment protections set forth in
Graham and Miller, there is no meaningful distinction between sentences of life imprisonment
without parole and prison sentences that extend beyond a juvenile’s life expectancy. Id. at 1143.
Within this section, the court analyzed cases from the California Supreme Court, Florida
Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Iowa Supreme Court, Wyoming Supreme Court,
Supreme Court of Connecticut, and the Supreme Court of Illinois. Id. at 1143–46.
112 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.015(g) (1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-108 (2019); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 3051, 4801 (Deering 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(IV), 18-1.340l(4)(b)(I) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(f) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4209A,
4204A(d)(2013); D.C. CODE § 22-2104(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 (2019); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 21-6618 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040(1) (LexisNexis 2019); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176.025 (2019); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03(4),
12.1-32-13.1 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31
(West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-209 (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7045
(2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-1 l-23(a)(2) (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (2019);
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1
N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013); State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018).
113

NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.017 (2019).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

15

2019]

JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE

117

of rehabilitation, prior record, and family, home, and community environment.114 In
Iowa, judges must consider the youth’s inability to cooperate with the police or
prosecution in addition to the other factors adopted by the state legislators of Florida,
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Missouri.115 Further, West Virginia legislators have
required that judges consider the juvenile defendant’s faith and community
involvement, participation in the child welfare system, school records, and trauma as
additional mitigating qualities associated with youth that the Miller and Montgomery
Courts reiterated throughout their opinions. 116 Although it is necessary for the
Supreme Court of Ohio to understand how other states have restricted the imposition
of juvenile LWOP statutorily, the court should also look to recent decisions from
judiciaries throughout the U.S. to better understand the various ways in which state
high courts have analyzed and applied Montgomery since the decision was released.
In Landrum v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted and applied
Montgomery as an amplifier of Miller.117 In doing so, the court found the defendant’s
LWOP sentence unconstitutional and remanded the case for resentencing.118 The court
explained, “Miller and Montgomery . . . require a sentence to consider age-related
evidence as mitigation, and permit the sentencing of a juvenile offender to life
imprisonment only in the most ‘uncommon’ and ‘rare’ case where the juvenile
offender’s crime reflects ‘irreparable corruption.’”119 Similarly, in Atwell v. State,
another Florida Supreme Court case interpreting juvenile LWOP, the court quashed a
juvenile defendant’s mandatory LWOP sentence after finding that the trial court failed
to provide the type of individualized sentencing consideration that Miller required and
that Montgomery reiterated.120 The court explained that Montgomery emphasized that
Miller required prisoners sentenced as juveniles to be “given the opportunity to show
their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some
years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”121
In State v. Valencia, the Supreme Court of Arizona applied Montgomery in
reversing a trial court’s holding that denied numerous juvenile defendants’ petitions
for post-conviction relief.122 The court held that because Montgomery clarified that
“Miller is a new substantive rule of constitutional law that must be given retroactive
effect by state courts,” the defendants were entitled to evidentiary hearings on their
petitions because “they made colorable claims for relief based on Miller.”123 The court
also explained that prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Miller and
114

FLA. STAT. § 921.1401 (2019); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 878.1 (2019); MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.033 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1 (2019).
115 IOWA

CODE §902.1 (2018).

116

W. VA. CODE § 61-11-23 (2019).

117

192 So. 3d 495, 467 (Fla. 2016).

118

Id. at 469.

119

Id.

120

197 So. 3d 1040, 1042–43 (Fla. 2016).

121

Id. at 1042.

122

386 P.3d 392, 393 (Ariz. 2016).

123

Id. at 395–96.
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Montgomery, when defendants were first being sentenced, trial courts were allowed
to impose LWOP sentences on juveniles convicted of first degree murder “without
distinguishing crimes that reflected ‘irreparable corruption’ rather than the ‘transient
immaturity of youth,’” suggesting that such a finding is now required in the State of
Arizona.124
In Veal v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded a juvenile
defendant’s LWOP sentence pursuant to Montgomery.125 In this case, the court
explained “Montgomery holds that ‘Miller announced a substantive rule of
constitutional law’ that ‘the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate for the
vast majority of juvenile offenders,’ with sentencing courts utilizing the process that
Miller set forth to determine whether a particular defendant falls into this almost-all
juvenile murderer category for which LWOP sentences are banned.”126 The court
explained that Montgomery made clear that “LWOP sentences may be constitutionally
imposed only on the worst-of-the-worst juvenile murderers.”127 Further, the court held
that trial courts are required to make distinct determinations on the record that a
juvenile offender is “irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible, as necessary to
put him in the narrow class of juvenile murderers for whom [a] LWOP sentence is
proportional under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and refined by
Montgomery.”128
In Windom v. State, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied a defendant’s motion to amend his petition for postconviction relief to add a claim pursuant to Montgomery and Miller.129 The court’s
2017 decision utilized Montgomery in determining whether or not the defendant’s
motion to amend was filed within a reasonable time following the issuance of the
decision, which made Miller applicable to his sentence of LWOP. 130 In finding that
the defendant’s sentencing hearing did not include evidence of the factors required by
Miller and Montgomery, the court held that his sentencing did not comport with the
requirements of the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.131 The court further explained
that because the record from the sentencing hearing was devoid of the terms “transient
immaturity of youth” and “irreparable corruption,” the defendant’s petition was
incorrectly dismissed because such terms needed to be explicitly proven pursuant to
Miller and Montgomery.132
In 2017, in Commonwealth v. Batts, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and remanded a juvenile defendant’s LWOP sentence after finding that the trial court
failed to prove that the defendant was irreparably corrupt and incapable of

124

Id. at 395.

125

784 S.E.2d 403, 405 (Ga. 2016).

126

Id. at 411.

127

Id. at 412.

128

Id.

129

398 P.3d 150, 158 (Idaho 2017).

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 157.
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rehabilitation.133 In doing so, the court recognized a presumption against the
imposition of a sentence of LWOP for a juvenile offender and categorized Miller and
Montgomery as safeguards “to ensure that life-without-parole sentences are meted out
only to ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’ whose crimes reflect ‘permanent
incorrigibility,’ ‘irreparable corruption,’ and ‘irretrievable depravity.’” 134 The court
concluded, “in the absence of the sentencing court reaching a conclusion, supported
by competent evidence, that the defendant will forever be incorrigible, without any
hope for rehabilitation, a life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile is illegal,
as it is beyond the court’s power to impose.”135
Lastly, in Davis v. State, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed and remanded
a LWOP sentence imposed upon a juvenile homicide offender.136 The court,
interpreting both Miller and Montgomery, emphasized that “[t]he Supreme Court
made clear that a sentencing court must determine that a juvenile is irreparably corrupt
or permanently incorrigible prior to a sentence of life without parole.” 137 Further, the
court held that “if the sentencing court sentences a juvenile to life or its functional
equivalent, it must make a finding that, in light of all the Miller factors, the juvenile
offender’s crime reflects irreparable corruption resulting in permanent incorrigibility,
rather than transient immaturity.”138 While understanding the ways in which state high
courts throughout the U.S. have interpreted and applied Montgomery is useful, the
Supreme Court of Ohio should look to the recent decisions from the Supreme Courts
of Washington and Iowa to better understand how and why it is essential that Ohio
bans the imposition of this unconstitutional sentence.
2. How the Supreme Courts of Washington and Iowa Utilized Montgomery v.
Louisiana to End Juvenile LWOP in Their Respective States
In October of 2018, the State of Washington became the most recent state in the
U.S to ban sentencing juveniles to LWOP. 139 In Washington v. Bassett, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that juvenile LWOP constitutes cruel punishment in
violation of the state’s constitution.140 At sixteen years old, Brian Bassett was
sentenced to mandatory LWOP for murdering his mother, father, and brother after
they kicked him out of their house.141 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions

133

163 A.3d 410, 459–60 (Pa. 2017).

134

Id. at 415–16.

135

Id. at 435.

136

415 P.3d 666, 696 (Wyo. 2018).

137

Id. at 680.

138

Id. at 684.

139

State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343 (Wash. 2018).

140 Id. at 346 (affirming the lower court’s decision and holding that “sentencing juvenile
offenders to life without parole or early release constitutes cruel punishment and therefore is
unconstitutional . . . under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution.”).
141

Id.
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in Miller and Montgomery, Bassett appealed his conviction at the age of thirtyfive.142
On appeal, Bassett referenced a recent statute that the Washington state legislature
had enacted, requiring courts to take into consideration the mitigating factors that
account for the diminished culpability of youth pursuant to Miller.143 In support of his
argument that his sentence of LWOP was unconstitutional, Bassett provided the court
with a number of factors suggesting that, while in prison, he had rehabilitated and
matured emotionally and behaviorally since his days as a teenager.144 Bassett set forth
that since his conviction and sentence of LWOP, he had successfully completed
courses that examined stress and family violence in an attempt to better understand
his crimes.145 He received his general equivalency diploma (“GED”) and a full tuition
scholarship for college, where he was placed on the honor roll. 146 Further, while still
behind bars, Bassett served as a mentor to others, and in 2010, he got married after
receiving premarital counseling.147
In agreeing with Bassett that sentencing juveniles to LWOP was violative of its
state constitution, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that “the direction of
change in this country is unmistakably and steadily moving toward abandoning the
practice of putting child offenders in prison for their entire lives.” 148 In reaching its
holding, the court discussed Miller, Roper, and Graham extensively, suggesting that
the U.S. Supreme Court has established a clear connection between youth and a
decreased moral culpability for criminal conduct, making this type of sentence unduly
harsh.149 In conclusion, the court held that because “states are rapidly abandoning
juvenile life without parole sentences, children are less criminally culpable than adults,
and the characteristics of youth do not support the penological goals of a life without
parole sentence,” such a sentence constitutes cruel punishment that is unconstitutional
in the State of Washington.150
142

Id.

Id. (“In response to Miller, our state legislature enacted what is referred to as the Millerfix statute. It requires sentencing courts to consider the Miller factors before sentencing a 16or 17-year-old convicted of aggravated first degree murder to life without parole. The statute
provides that ‘the court must take into account the mitigating factors that amount for the
diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama including, but not limited to,
the age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life experience, the degree of responsibility
the youth was capable of exercising, and the youth’s chances of becoming rehabilitated.’ The
statute mandated that individuals who had been sentenced to juvenile life without parole under
the former mandatory scheme, such as Bassett, be resentenced under this new statute.” (citations
omitted)).
143

144

Id. at 346–47.

145

Id. at 347.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 352.

149

Id. at 352–53.

Id. at 353. The court expounded on these “penological goals” in their opinion, explaining
that they pertain to “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,” all of which are
supposed to be served through the imposition of a LWOP sentence. Id. (“First, the case for
150
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Another case that the Supreme Court of Ohio should consider in banning juvenile
LWOP comes from the Supreme Court of Iowa. In its 2016 decision in State v. Sweet,
as discussed above, the highest court in Iowa reversed a juvenile defendant’s LWOP
sentence and held that juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to LWOP in the
state.151 In Sweet, sixteen-year-old Isaiah Sweet shot and killed his grandfather and his
grandfather’s wife, whom he had lived with since he was four years old.152 According
to Sweet, his grandfather’s wife was dying of cancer and every night his grandfather
would call him expletives and “told [him] to just kill [himself] and fall off the earth.” 153
After pleading guilty to two counts of first-degree murder, a sentencing court reviewed
a PSI report that was prepared in anticipation of the hearing.154 The report detailed the
facts surrounding Sweet’s crime, his tumultuous family dynamics, his unfortunate
childhood circumstances, and his emotional and personal health. 155 The report also
documented that over the course of Sweet’s short life, he had already attempted suicide
several times.156 Regardless, and even after state psychologists testified at Sweet’s trial
that his prospects for rehabilitation were “mixed,” the court sentenced him to
LWOP.157
On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, Sweet asserted his age, immaturity,
impetuousness, family and home environment, and prospects for rehabilitation in
arguing that his LWOP sentence was constitutionally impermissible. 158 In agreeing
with Sweet, the court explained, “[t]he Montgomery Court stressed that Miller barred
life in prison without the possibility of parole for ‘all but the rarest of juvenile
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.’” 159 Today, in the
State of Iowa, a juvenile can remain in prison without the possibility of parole only
after he or she has spent time in prison and still shows signs of irreparable and
irredeemable corruption.160 Ultimately, the court concluded that making the
retribution is weakened for children because [t]he heart of the retribution rationale relates to an
offender’s blameworthiness and children have diminished culpability. Nor can deterrence do
the work in this context, because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable
than adults—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to
consider potential punishment. Rehabilitation is not supported by a juvenile life without parole
sentence because the sentence forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” (citations omitted)).
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Id. at 836–37 (“In reviewing the caselaw development, we believe, in the exercise of our
independent judgment, that the enterprise of identifying which juvenile offenders are
irretrievable at the time of trial is simply too speculative and likely impossible given what we
now know about the timeline of brain development and related prospects for self-regulation and
rehabilitation . . . a district court at the time of trial cannot apply the Miller factors in any
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determination that a juvenile is irredeemably corrupt at the time of sentencing is a
finding that violates that juvenile’s rights that are protected under the state’s
constitution.161 Both Bassett and Sweet serve as perfect examples for how the Supreme
Court of Ohio should go about banning the imposition of juvenile LWOP in the State
of Ohio.
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Ohio deems persuasive the ways in which
other state high courts throughout the U.S. have interpreted the imposition of juvenile
LWOP.162 It made this recognition even before Montgomery and before a near
majority of states throughout the U.S. banned the imposition of the sentence. Thus,
the next time the Supreme Court of Ohio is tasked with analyzing juvenile LWOP, the
only outcome in such a case is for the court to ban the sentence and require that all
juveniles, no matter their crime, be given the possibility of parole at the time of their
sentence.
IV. THE SOLUTION
When the Supreme Court of Ohio is tasked with interpreting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s most recent juvenile LWOP case, the court should use that opportunity to ban
the imposition of this unconstitutional sentence in Ohio. In its place, the court should
require that juveniles be sentenced with the possibility of parole, no matter their
crimes.163 As addressed above, a sentence of LWOP for juveniles inflicts astronomical
economic costs upon states that permit the imposition of the sentence. Such a sentence
also suggests that rehabilitation is an impossibility. Further, as evidenced by the
examples provided in this Note, sentencing courts can incorrectly predict irreparable
corruption, and thereby violate a juvenile’s constitutional rights by imposing a
sentence upon them that is cruel and unjust. Taking these concerns into consideration,
the Supreme Court of Ohio should also note the growing and near majority number of
states that have banned this sentence, and utilize this recognized need for change as
grounds for joining them.
One counterargument to banning the imposition of juvenile LWOP is that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s line of cases already serve as a satisfactory safeguard for the nation’s
children. That is, because the current law only allows courts to sentence juveniles to
LWOP if their crimes reflect irreparable corruption, placing them amongst the worst
offenders, then this standard is sufficient to protect juveniles from this unconstitutional
sentence. As evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions and the cases decided
in state courts of last resort throughout the nation, however, sentencing courts can still

principled way to identify with assurance those very few adolescent offenders that might later
be proven to be irretrievably depraved. In short, we are asking the sentencer to do the
impossible, namely, to determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at a time when
even trained professionals with years of clinical experience would not attempt to make such a
determination.”).
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OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.01(E) (2018) (“‘Parole’ means, regarding a prisoner who is
serving a prison term for aggravated murder or murder, who is serving a prison term of life
imprisonment for rape or for felonious sexual penetration . . .or who was sentenced prior to July
1, 1996, a release of the prisoner from confinement in any state correctional institution by the
adult parole authority that is subject to the eligibility criteria specified in this chapter . . . .”).
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get it wrong. As it is evident that an incorrect prediction that a juvenile is incapable of
rehabilitation can result in a lifetime spent in prison, courts can no longer be given the
power to make such perilous mistakes.
Another counterargument is that banning juvenile LWOP would pose too great a
danger to society because courts will no longer be able to impose this harsh sentence
on juveniles, no matter how troubling their crimes. In the alternative to a sentence of
LWOP, however, this Note does not suggest that juveniles be given a definitive release
date when being sentenced. Rather, it simply urges Ohio courts to provide juveniles at
least the possibility of parole. That is, if a juvenile has committed a horrific crime,
rather than sentencing them to LWOP, a sentencing court would be expected to impose
a prison term on that defendant and provide them with a later date that they would be
eligible to be considered for parole. When that date comes, it would be the task of the
sentencing court to determine whether or not the defendant should be released and
placed on parole, or receive an extended sentence.164 No matter the argument, the lives
of Ohio’s children depend on the Supreme Court of Ohio finding juvenile LWOP
sentences unconstitutional. Such a decision will place Ohio in line with a growing
number of states that have already banned this unconstitutional sentence and will
further protect the most vulnerable age group in this country by recognizing the critical
value of the words “cruel and unusual punishment.”
V. CONCLUSION
In Moore, the Supreme Court of Ohio stressed that “the United States Supreme
Court has all but abolished life-without-parole sentences.”165 Given that the court
recognized this trend in case law even before the Court’s Montgomery decision, it is
now compellingly necessary for the Supreme Court of Ohio to join the growing and
near majority of states that are banning the imposition of juvenile LWOP. Not only
would doing so place Ohio in line with these states, but such a decision would alleviate
the state of the costly burdens imposed by these sentences. Even more importantly,
such a decision would ensure that no trial judge would be tasked with determining the
impossible: whether a child will be capable of rehabilitation throughout the course of
his or her life.
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Ohio Revised Code § 2967.03 explains the process through which a defendant may be
placed on parole. OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.03 (2018) (“The adult parole authority . . . may
exercise its functions and duties in relation to the parole of a prisoner who is eligible for parole
upon the initiative of the head of the institution in which the prisoner is confined or upon its
own initiative. When a prisoner becomes eligible for parole, the head of the institution in which
the prisoner is confined shall notify the authority in the manner prescribed by the authority. The
authority may investigate and examine, or cause the investigation and examination of, prisoners
confined in state correctional institutions concerning their conduct in the institutions, their
mental and moral qualities and characteristics, their knowledge of a trade or profession, their
former means of livelihood, their family relationships, and any other matters affecting their
fitness to be at liberty without being a threat to society . . . . If a victim, victim’s representative,
or the victim’s spouse, parent, sibling, or child appears at a full board hearing of the parole
board and gives testimony as authorized by section 5149.101 of the Revised Code, the authority
shall consider the testimony in determining whether to grant a parole . . . . The trial judge, the
prosecuting attorney, specified law enforcement agency members, and a representative of the
prisoner may appear at a full board hearing of the parole board and give testimony in regard to
the grant of a parole to the prisoner as authorized by section 5149.101 of the Revised Code.”).
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Banning the imposition of juvenile LWOP protects juveniles’ constitutional
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. More importantly, doing so will
allow prisoners that have rehabilitated since being sentenced as juveniles to re-enter
civilization and contribute to society. Although the Supreme Court of the United States
has yet to ban juvenile LWOP, the Supreme Court of Ohio must not wait to protect its
state’s juveniles and do away with the sentence once and for all.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

23

